Israel’s 2006 Syndrome Haunts Today’s IDF: Israel’s Current Geostrategic Pickle

Yahya Sinwar – Hamas leader in Gaza, sitting relaxed in a comfortable chair after an Israeli missile attack on Gaza. The message is unambiguous: we (the Palesitnians) don’t fear you (the Israelis) anymore.

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Strange as it might seem to those whose minds are pickled in American mainstream narratives on Israel and the Palestinians, but all the same it is one of those “facts on the ground”: No one is afraid of Israel anymore in the Middle East. 17 years After 2006 War and the possible/probable of renewed Middle East War between Israel and the Axis of Resistance on the battle field increasingly it is Hezbollah and its allies in the Axis of Resistance that are taking the strategic initiative with Israel finding itself increasingly on the defensive. Israeli leadership is in a pickle concerning major military action: damned if they do; damned if they don’t

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Nearly a year ago, when we were still welcomed on KGNU – Hemispheres – Middle East Dialogues – Ibrahim Kazerooni and I (Rob Prince) did a program entitled “The Turkish Tap Dance, The ‘Israeli Pickle’ and the JCPOA – The Middle East, A Region in Transition.” That program surprised many listeners because, despite appearances to the contrary, we argued then that Israel found itself in both a domestic and regional “existential” crisis.

Today, we take this argument even further – the crisis Israel finds itself in has deepened both domestically and regionally.. The “the pickle” is more expansive. To understand “the pickle” we need to return to the 2006 war in which Israel invaded Lebanon with the specific U.S. Israeli goal of “neutralizing” Hezbollah as a political force in Lebanon and restructuring the whole of the Middle East to its liking – a “Sykes-Picot II” to further weaken if not destroy the nationalist aspirations of countries in the region. The plan was brought to light in in 2003 by General Wesley Clark. Washington and Tel Aviv’s plans for a major regional restructuring could not be accomplished without neutralizing or wiping out Hezbollah; it was Israel’s role for the United States to accomplish that goal.

The Israeli invasion failed and spectacularly so. Israel was forced to withdraw its forces after suffering historic losses. As Combat Studies Institute analyst Matt Matthews noted in his study We were caught unprepared: the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War

Without question, the Israeli ground campaign revealed an army confused by its new doctrine. Soldiers were deficient in training and equipment, and senior officers seemed woefully unprepared to fight a “real war.” By the time the United Nations (UN) cease-fire went into effect on 14 August 2006, many military analysts were convinced the IDF had suffered a significant defeat. One source held that Hezbollah’s military and political victory was absolute and irrefutable.3 Even more revealing were the comments by Mossad Chief, Meir Degan, and the head of Shin Bet, Yuval Diskin, during a meeting with Prime Minister Olmert in the immediate aftermath of the war. Both men pointedly told Olmert “the war was a national catastrophe and Israel suffered a critical blow.”

The Israeli leadership was severely chastised, including Prime Minister Olmert and most of his cabinet for going to war without a plan, clear goals of what to accomplish.  Olmert and much of his cabinet were forced to resign as a result. What is less appreciated – if appreciated at all – here in the USA – is that Israel’s failure in its 2006 invasion of Lebanon resulted in a shift in the balance of power in the region that has only intensified until now., the most salient of which are three:

– Israel’s inability to dictate regional policy by going to war. It is no longer the invincible power it thought itself to be in the region (and was). With the 2006 defeat, the myth of Israeli invincibility began to implode.

–  As Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion noted, Israel’s strength is not in only in its military might but in the mindset Israel impose on our neighbors not to challenge us. Israel a weaker power than it appeared. The fear to challenge Israel military began to recede if not evaporate.  From now on, the Palestinians and Arabs as a whole began to fight back militarily more assertively.

– Although some indications of this before the 2006 war, it was fundamentally the result of that war which resulted in the emergence of an “axis of resistance” – ignored and unappreciated by many in the USA – but known and followed carefully, and feared frankly, in Israel

Already prior to the failed 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon there were indications of a growing “axis of resistance”, a sort of united front against both the USA and Israel taking shape. In April, 2003, as reported in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz,  then U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell was hoping to dissuade Syrian President Bashar Assad from supporting Hezbollah. Powell pressed Assad to stop supporting Hezbollah; in return he offered Syria extensive economic. Assad later commented that the pain of continued support and cooperation with Hezbollah was better than capitulation to Washington DC. Assad and Syria would pay a harsh price for this principled stand.

That was then…

After all these years the Axis of Resistance has gotten stronger, it includes countries (Iran, Syria) and movements for change (Hezbollah, Hamas among the Palestinians, the Yemeni rebels). This Axis of Resistance is growing stronger and is increasingly moved from the defensive to an offensive posture militarily. The world is witnessing a growing consolidation of Palestinians everywhere, part of the consequences of the strengthening of the Axis of Resistance.

It is noticeable in the recent Israeli attack against Jenin which they were forced to call of after two days, in the increasing consolidation of a dynamic single front against Israel, in the Palestinian resistance in defending Gaza from attack, in the Syrian resistance against Washington’s failure to overthrow the Assad government. And most notably this shift in the balance of forces is reflected in Israel’s growing reluctance to openly challenge Hezbollah militarily in Southern Lebanon again for fear that the Israeli Defense Force might suffer an even greater defeat than they experienced in 2006. 

The long-term effects of the 2006 failed Israeli Lebanon offensive have created a psychological mindset in Israel that led to the deterioration of Israeli domestic economic and social situation  Hezbollah has become increasingly bolder while Israel is increasingly hesitant to respond to Hezbollah militarily to such an extent that we can speak of an Israeli 2006 Syndrome, Israel’s version of the U.S. Vietnam Syndrome. This is the heart of “the Israeli pickle:: No one is afraid of Israel anymore in the Middle East: To invade or not to invade, that is the question. Should it risk war with Lebanon and Syria to once again try to break the back of the Axis of Resistance given the risks such military action might  entail.

We are at a dangerous crossroads once again. Like the United States, Israel is suffering from a classic case of a wounded beast syndrome. For has powerful as it is militarily, it is damned if it goes to war … and damned if it doesn’t.

Will this summer be a turning point?