Tunisia Since Independence – Somethings change at the top; Institutionally it all remains the same.

the mausoleum of Ferhat Hached, labor leader extraordinaire, main force behind the birth of the General Union of Tunisian Workers *UGTT” which remains today one of the most interesting and influential national trade union confederation not only in the Arab world but in the Global South. Standing at his tomb, his daughter, Djamila Chaari. November, 2011. (photo credit: R. Prince)

 

Whether Kais Saied’s constitutional reforms hold remains to be seen. Yet let’s be clear – this historical sketch is about political changes at the top. What does it matter if power shifts from the Parliament to the presidency – or visa versa – if, in neither case, such political developments are not combined with a socio-economic vision and program to deal with the structural crisis in Tunisian society?

In the case of Ben Ali and Ghannouchi/Ennahdha hopes for serious structural, institutional change were dashed, and that rather early on in both cases. No doubt there is considerable relief that Ennahdha’s days in power are, it appears, now in the past. There was nothing short of a nation-wide sigh of relief. Indeed, the years of Ennahdha rule are referred to as “the black decade.” But if the Said presidency is simply yet another version of “rearranging the chairs on the Titanic” then Saied’s “victory” in outmaneuvering Rachid Ghannouchi are indeed hollow.

Let’s hope for the best, but be cognisant of how little has changed in Tunisian national life by simply changing leadership… without accompanying far reaching institutional reforms it becomes just an exercise of political musical chairs.

Trying to make sense of history, Tunisian history

Trying to get my finger on the pulse concerning the patterns of Tunisian history… I notice certain parallels – Bourguiba to Ben Ali to (behind the scene) Ghannouchi to Kais Said. A shuffling of chairs at the top as leaders become ineffective with age (Bourguiba), corrupt beyond belief (Ben Ali) or so religiously factional (Ghannouchi – Ennahdha) to have split Tunisian society and lost its initial base…. and now Kais Said, who seems to be running into similar problems (more on this later). Each was able to remove – overthrow an increasingly unpopular and ineffective leader from office only to be removed later themselves for failing to address the underlying structural crisis that has plagued Tunisian for so long. In all the cases, promise of “democracy” and “human rights” evaporated into what was little more than attempts to cling to power with all the repression and corruption that entailed, be it in the name of more secular or more Islamic emphasis. The promised changes, needed reforms never happened. Funny thing… and in the end the Bourguiba-Ben Ali-Ghannouchi soup all tasted the same with slightly different seasoning. Will Kais Saied break the mold? Or is he simply more of the same?

Trying to get my finger on the pulse concerning the patterns of Tunisian history… I notice certain parallels – Bourguiba to Ben Ali to (behind the scene) Ghannouchi to Kais Said. A shuffling of chairs at the top as leaders become ineffective with age (Bourguiba), corrupt beyond belief (Ben Ali) or so religiously factional (Ghannouchi – Ennahdha) to have split Tunisian society and lost its initial base…. and now Kais Said, who seems to be running into similar problems (more on this later). Each was able to remove – overthrow an increasingly unpopular and ineffective leader from office only to be removed later themselves for failing to address the underlying structural crisis that has plagued Tunisian for so long. In all the cases, promise of “democracy” and “human rights” evaporated into what was little more than attempts to cling to power with all the repression and corruption that entailed, be it in the name of more secular or more Islamic emphasis. The promised changes, needed reforms never happened. Funny thing… and in the end the Bourguiba-Ben Ali-Ghannouchi soup all tasted the same with slightly different seasoning. Will Kais Saied break the mold? Or is he simply more of the same?

Bourguiba – he was able to navigate Tunisian independence from France’s colonial domination, in part by playing the U.S. off against France and in part by promising that economic reforms his administration would undertake would not threaten Tunisia’s traditional role as a semi-peripheral player in the global economy and that Tunisia’s regional policies would remain firmly in the hands of both Washington and Paris. His downfall – well there are a number of factors some out of his control like the impact of the trajectory of the global economy – its slowing down – but the key point – after the bread riots of 1982, Bourguiba refused to go along with IMF structural adjustment programs in exchange for badly needed loans. He is replaced by Zine Ben Ali, someone who, interesting enough, had gotten some training in Washington DC

Zine Ben Ali – Opens up the country to a brief period of freer press, more open society only for the open political doors to be slammed shut (in the name of fighting Islamic extremism). One of his first political actions was to ask for and get IMF structural adjustment loans conditional, as such loans are, on permitting international capital to pry open the country’s economy and privatize sizeable chunks of it. Follows U.S. regional policy to a “t” (down to the last detail), but his increasingly repressive policies and his witch hunt against Islamicist elements on the one hand and the secular left on the other alienates increasingly large elements of Tunisian society, so much so that by 2011, Tunisia is ripe for a major social upheaval. Corruption levels reach points never even dreamed off in the Bourguiba years (yes, there was corruption but with a small “c” in contrast to Ben Ali’s much larger one). Zine Ali is overthrown by some of the largest and most militant demonstrations in the country’s history. But other than getting rid of Ben Ali and his associates, the movement had no guiding vision or program, making it ripe for cooptation. Over the years we’ve learned the role of U.S. manipulated NGOs like the National Endowment Democracy, a U.S. funded basically privatized version of the Central Intelligence Agency was active in steering the revolt in such a direction that there would be basically no change in the country’s institutional structures.

Still, the social movement was strong enough to sweep Ben Ali from power – no small accomplishment – but not capable enough to institute more deep going (more commonly referred to as “radical”) forms of institutional change, e… all the change necessary to maintain the status quo that a bearded German philosopher once wrote about)

Rachid Ghannouchi/Ennahdha – Ennahdha, Tunisia’s version of the Muslim Brotherhood, “ruled from behind”, from the Parliament after pushing through a constitution that would strip the country’s president of all but ceremonial powers and then installing a secular human rights advocate (with no real power, but a rather large ego) as president. Once again, Tunisia, largely through the efforts of its people, organized, militant and with a radical socio-economic agenda is able to get “half a loaf” – getting rid of Ben Ali but failing, in large measure because of foreign pressure, to achieve meaningful institutional change. Ennahdha genuinely had the possibility given its strong broad based national support early on (2011-2015) to make some changes to address the country’s deepening socio-economic crisis, but like Ben Ali before it, Ennahdha failed miserably. Other than “islamicizing” the country to its own image (that of the Muslim Brotherhood) and engaging in a form of religious nepotism that would have even embarrassed Ben Ali (whose family had fled and found refuge in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia),, Ennahda, like its “brother” administration of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt, lacks a socioeconomic program that could address the country’s deepening socio-economic crisis and was removed from power in “an electoral coup”. Rather than producing both a vision and a program that might begin to address Tunisia’s socio-economic crisis, Ennahdha with political support from Qatar and Turkey in particular goes on a crash program of formed “islamification” of Tunisian society, a country by the way that is already 98% Sunni Muslim but of a moderate more open and relaxed variety of that religious tradition. The result was not difficult to predict because it was so blatant, so obvious: Ennahdha and Ghannouchi waste and lose the political capital it had earned in 2011.

Five years on already, by 2016, the initial national enthusiasm for the post Ben Ali government had turned to opposition and bitterness creating the conditions for yet another political “bouleversement ” (upheaval), that of 2019 when (at least for mainstream Tunisian society as a whole), an obscure University legal scholar, known for his religious piety and principle, Kais Saied, surprised Tunisian society as a whole by seemingly coming out of nowhere (which usually means there are some powerful hidden benefactors) to win Tunisia’s presidential election – his main positive attribute being that while a Muslim scholar, he was not associated with Ennahdha! Thus ended what many Tunisians refer to as “the black decade” – and this it was…

Kais Saied – Will the Kais Saied presidency endure? Will his “electoral coup” and constitutional changes remain? Too early to tell. His October 2019 surprise electoral victory was something of “a shocker”. He won in a landslide, taking 72.71 per cent of the vote, a full 40 points ahead of his nearest competitor. No doubt the loser was not just Nabil Karoui but the Ennahdha Party’s nine years of misrule. If Saied was pretty much a stranger to the Tunisian electorate, there is little doubt that Tunisians wanted and insisted upon a change. Saied’s anti corruption campaign struck a chord. Since then Saied’s main goal has been to strip Ennahdha of its power base, starting with dissolving the constitution, calling for a referendum on a new constitution which would transfer power back to the presidency and away from the Ennahda controlled Tunisian parliament, reversing the 2014 referendum which did exactly the opposite – stripping the presidency of much its power and removing that power to the Parliament. No doubt in making such moves Said has some support. . While his constitutional changed did gain electoral support, the percentage of those voting was low and the process leading to the referendum was filled with irregularities and charges of voter fraud. At the time of this writing it is not at all clear that either the referendum results or Saied’s hold on the presidency will hold.

Some of Saied’s support, surprisingly, came from the secular left, from long time human rights groups and the Tunisian labor movement. More importantly perhaps, a good share of the country’s youth stand with Kais Saied and continue that support after the referendum. But much of the judiciary and some of elements connected with Ennahdha have fought back and their call for an election boycott resonated in certain circles. On the other side, helping his cause, his growing unpopularity with powerful international forces. Both the U.S. State Department and that part of the media that covered the referendum process in the USA has been quite critical. This brought an unprecedented response from both the Saied Administration as well as important elements of civil society, including Tunisia’s still influential national labor federation – the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT – Union General de Travailleurs Tunisiens) which carries considerable weight.

Final note:

Whether Kais Saied’s constitutional reforms hold remains to be seen. Yet let’s be clear – this historical sketch is about political changes at the top. What does it matter if power shifts from the Parliament to the presidency – or visa versa – if, in neither case, such political developments are not combined with a socio-economic vision and program to deal with the structural crisis in Tunisian society?

In the case of Ben Ali and Ghannouchi/Ennahdha hopes for serious structural, institutional change were dashed, and that rather early on in both cases. No doubt there is considerable relief that Ennahdha’s days in power are, it appears, now in the past. There was nothing short of a nation-wide sigh of relief. Indeed, the years of Ennahdha rule are referred to as “the black decade.” But if the Said presidency is simply yet another version of “rearranging the chairs on the Titanic” then Saied’s “victory” in outmaneuvering Rachid Ghannouchi are indeed hollow.

Let’s hope for the best, but be cognisant of how little has changed in Tunisian national life by simply changing leadership… without accompanying far reaching institutional reforms it becomes just an exercise of political musical chairs.

Stay tuned…