Connections with Joel Edelstein: Grand Illusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East by Steven Simon – Aired on KGNU – May 5, 2023. Unofficial Transcript

 

_________________________________

I think there are a lot of voices now, or at least there are some, to challenge the notion that whatever you thought of the effort of empire … stop it! We cannot aspire any longer to “empire” if it ever made sense – and I’m not saying it ever did  – and we’ve got to transition to living in a polycentric world in which the United States is one of a number of important powers. That’s a real challenge; it’s a challenge for the whole country. It’s a challenge because there are a lot of Americans who believe that we are the ones to run the world.

Joel Edelstein

The only way out of the crisis is that notion of Pax Americana that Americans should dominate and dictate to the rest of the world – that phase is over and we have to prepare ourselves for a world in which there are multiple players in global politics, whether regional or global politics. We need to work together if we really want peace. This notion that Simon refers to “to make the Middle East a better place for its people while advancing U.S. strategic interests – this notion has to be abandoned.

Ibrahim Kazerooni

I was thinking about aging – how can I help it, I’m 78 with health problems that come with it. Recently a friend referred to me as “one of the elders”. I never thought myself that, but I realize I am. Am I going to age “gracefully”or “gracelessly.”  In terms of what you just said Joel, those are the choices open to the United States. The United States has had – let’s just say – a fine run. It’s not about to collapse but its glory days are past and it’s in decline. Frankly, people have been talking about this since the 1970s. There is nothing new about this discussion. Many people understand exactly what you said, Joel. The United States still has an important role to play in the world. Can we adjust to the new multipolar realities. So far the country reminds me of a petulant teenager ‘ “I’m not going to change! I’m not going to change!” Regardless, the world IS changing, and HAS changed. We can either respond to those changes gracefully or … not

Rob Prince

_________________________________

Joel Edelstein opening the program: “Steven Simon is a policy insider having spent nearly 40 years in top positions making U.S. Middle East policy. When I received the announcement of his new book on what he has observed, I wanted to give listeners to Connections to hear what he has to say.” (Simon’s schedule did not permit a live interview on Connections so Edelstein settled for a taped interview.) “I invited the producers of KGNU monthly Middle East dialogues, Ibrahim Kazerooni and Rob Prince and they will join me in the second half of the program.

For Simon’s own remarks on “The Grand Illusion” and the entire program:

Remarks of Ibrahim Kazerooni and Rob Prince are transcribed below:

Joel Edelstein: Steven, thank you so much for your time. The book is The Grand Illusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East. It’s well worth the read. Thank you so much.

Steven Simon: Thank you. Appreciate it.

Joel Edelstein: That was a recorded interview with Steven Simon. It was recorded because Steven Simon because Steven Simon’s new book had him on “kind of” a book tour at least on the phone or on Zoom and his availability was quite limited. I wanted to bring him to our KGNU listening audience and so I recorded it because that was the only option … What I decided was we would follow the tradition of KGNU that we want to hear from you, the listeners and so we interviewed Simon for a half hour so you can have another half hour to call in to 303-442-4242

It isn’t just a matter of calling in to speak to me, Joel Edelstein, what do I know … so what I got is KGNU’s Middle East analysts Ibrahim Kazerooni and Rob Prince. They join us now to talk about Steven Simon’s book.

Welcome Ibrahim, Welcome Rob

Start out by reminding our listeners who may not have heard you on Tuesday evenings … What is your relation to the Middle East?

Rob Prince: I am a retired Senior Lecturer of International Studies at the University of Denver’s Korbel School of International Studies, lonk history of involvement in the Middle East going back to the days when I was a Peace Corps volunteer. I’ve written about it extensively. My main interest was a focus on North Africa –  which is what I taught about, specifically Algeria and Tunisia.

Having said that, the region is something I have had a lifetime concern about – U.S. policy in the Middle East, where it’s been, where it’s headed.

Joel Edelstein: Ibrahim.

Ibrahim Kazerooni: Yes, good morning to everyone.

To a degree I am similar to Rob as far as my political background is concerned. I am from the Middle East, from Iraq and I have traveled frequently in the Middle East. Recently I have visited Iran and Iraq in an effort to understand. I have many contacts in the region, read widely in order to analyze the political circumstances in the region, particularly since the 2003 invasion of Iraq which has become an issue of paramount importance to me. Those who have followed my lectures and writings, they understand to what I am referring.

Joel Edelstein: Very good.

I just want to throw it open to both of you; you have both read Steven Simon’s book and presumably heard a part of the interview we just broadcast.;

What do you think about this guy who was really “in the room”. He wasn’t speaking authoritatively for the United States government. His book, even though he’s an insider, has slashing criticism of U.S. policy.

How does his voice come across to you?

Rob Prince: Ibrahim, do you mind if I start off?

Ibrahim Kazerooni: No, go ahead.

Ibrahim Kazerooni: Firstly, Simon’s book is a very interesting read., unquestionably. It reminded me some of works of British journalist, Robert Fisk whose work gives a broad sense of what is transpiring throughout the region of the Middle East. There are some problems with the very breath of Simon’s work. There is so much that he covers that it becomes difficult to cover the material in more than a sketchy manner.

In terms of the positive points the book offers, there are a number of them I want to mention.

The main positive point is what you just spoke about Joel: Simon underlines what was Washington’s flawed vision for the region, that is the myth of the Soviet threat to the Middle East, that the Soviets were about to invade and take over Middle East oil or that they might do something like that when in fact already the Soviet Union was already the largest, or second largest producer of oil in the world even during that period (the period of the Cold War). From a geopolitical viewpoint there was no possibility of such a scenario. That would have been suicide for the Soviet Union. to invade the Middle East.

This is an important point because we have a whole half century of policy based upon a non-existent threat. This is the most important point that Simon makes and he makes it very well.

He goes on to discuss the Middle East policies of six presidents. I felt I was reading a personal history as over that period I was concerned about these events but the essence of what he describes is the repetition of unending tactical blunders on the part of the different administrations. There are some people who would blame the failure of U.S. Middle East policy either on Democrats or Republicans. But Simon insists it was a bipartisan policy. 

Such criticisms were heard from Ibrahim and myself, and I think it’s fair to note, Joel, yourself.

But now we see the criticisms appearing in the mainstream media articulated by a key player in six Administrations.

There are other positive themes in Simon’s book but because of time, let me discuss what I see as the book’s limitations.

The most important limitation of the book is the framework. Simon accepts the whole notion of American exceptionalism, the idea that U.S. intentions in the Middle East region were honorable. True, time and again “we” messed up but our goal was to build prosperity and democracy.

If that is the accepted framework the book becomes a justification of the overall goals of U.S. policy. That framework is problematic. I would add a few other points:

• The heart to understanding U.S. interests in the Middle East is American control of oil (and natural gas) and the way that energy upholds the value of the dollar. Simon does mention it on occasion but doesn’t delve into the subject seriously enough. At the end of the book he suggests that controlling oil flows is important framing it within the context of the tension between human rights and strategic interests but Simon doesn’t go into the subject to the degree it deserves
• One other point that surprised me. On page 16 – I did read that far – Simon admits that he served in the Israeli military during the 1973 Middle East War. This raises the question of his objectivity.
• And finally his descriptions of U.S. regional opponents, be it Iran, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the Palestinians compared to his discussions of what was happening in the State Department, were quite shallow. My starting point is always – even if there are disagreements with opponents, it is essential to try to put oneself in their shoes so as the understand where they are coming from. There wasn’t a lot of that in the book.

Ibrahim, do you have anything you want to add?

Ibrahim Kazerooni: Yes. I tend to agree

Before going into macro and micro criticism of the book, it needs to be understood that political analyses depend on their starting point. If the starting point is that the United States is never going to make an intentional mistake, a notion driven by American exceptionalism, Manifest Destiny, this noble virtuous project traveling the world to correct the mistakes of others – as Simon asserts – that the U.S. has no other goal that to advance “the good” of the Middle East – this leads to certain conclusions.

By the way this reminds me of 2003 – the advent of the U.S. led invasion of Ira2q – when Colin Powell was in the United Kingdom for a conference. He was asked by the Archbishop of Canterbury if the plans for Iraq were just an example of empire building by George Bush. His (Powell’s) response was astonishing. He replied:

Over the years the United States has sent some of its fine men and women into great peril to fight for freedom beyond our borders. The only amount of land we have ever asked for in return is enough bury those who did not return.

Very magnanimous!

If you believe in that kind of ideology that Washington has nothing but good intentions for the people of the Middle East then obviously even your criticism is limited to the administrative results rather than on the objective goals. The fact that over 1.5 million members of Iraq’s civilian population lost their lives becomes irrelevant.

Secondly, the idea that how the Iraqis – or those others that we (the U.S.) has bombed out of existence during this period – “the wretched of the earth” to quote Fanon – might consider the U.S. intervention – this fact becomes irrelevant.

One of the problems that Simon has in writing this book is that it is written looking back with “hindsight vision.” Twenty years after the invasion of Iraq given the huge number of books, analyses that have become available in the marketplace since 2003, and before it even since the invasion of Afghanistan, every piece, every component of his thesis has been dealt with by others. I’ll just give one or two examples.

For example in regard to the crisis facing U.S foreign policy, there is Stephen Walt’s The Hell of Good Intentions. This was written prior to Simon’s book. If you want to understand U.S. foreign policy from a realist view point and the problem with their approach try John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. There is also George Kennan’s American Diplomacy. There are others.

All the component’s of Simon’s thesis have been dealt with in other books.

There is one thing that he has not been able to explain so far; I’ll give you one example.

From the end of World War II till the early 1980 no American soldiers were killed in the greater Middle East. Since 1990, no American soldier has been killed anywhere else but in the Middle East. Simon fails to explain this transition from the Second World War until 1980.

Joel Edelstein: That’s Ibrahim Kazerooni. Rob Prince is also with us. I would like you to join us at 303-442-4242. If you have a question or a comment, now is the time to do it.

Ibrahim Kazerooni: Can I add one point that refers to a factual inaccuracy.

Simon writes that “despite all the mistakes, lives lost and money wasted, the [U.S. Middle East] strategy won out. Since the end of the Second World War America’s overriding purpose in the Middle East has been to secure two states, Israel and Saudi Arabia, both which he believes there were good reasons to protect.  Despite the scorn heaped on the United States for its serial blunders Washington succeeded in accomplishing these two goals. I leave it to the audience to decide whether factually he is correct.

Rob Prince: I wanted to add something about this transition of no Americans dying prior to 1980 and then after 1990 Americans dying nowhere else but in the region. It has to do with the turning point. What was the turning point in U.S. policy. One interesting part of the book is his discussion of the aftereffect of 9/11 that a militarization in U.S. policy took place which is obvious to all.

But I would cite another moment for the turning point in U.S. policy: it comes earlier. Simon talks about it but …

Joel Edelstein: He talks about 1980, Reagan coming to office and Lebanon when the 256 marines died there.

Rob Prince: That’s correct but there is something the year prior to that changed the whole region and that was the Iranian Revolution of 1979 with the loss of support of Iran as a key regional ally. From that point onward U.S. policy has been at a loss. Washington did not seem to know how to respond to this historic upheaval. The only response has been increased militarization. What could have been done to improve relations in the region never happened after that. From that moment we can note an ever increasing downward spiral of U.S. influence. I wish he would have emphasized that too. In fact the events in Lebanon to which you referred Joel are a direct result of the loss of Iran as a regional ally.

I don’t think he used the term “hegemony” anywhere in the book either as I recall.

Joel Edelstein: I don’t think so. I think you’re right.

Rob Prince: At a time – the present moment – when the term is almost universally used I find it curious that it was not a part of the discussion.

Ibrahim Kazerooni: Can I add one point?

He talks about – but never outlines – what was the grand strategy for the region whether it was Reagan’s or any administration earlier. Beyond the domination of oil, what was the grand strategy that failed and what is the hope for the future. For me that is a major failure.

Rob Prince: And I would add, what’s the grand strategy today? Especially at this moment where the “opponent” is changing – the whole balance of power in the region is in flux with China, Russia increasing their influence in the Middle East.

What would be a positive, constructive U.S. Middle East policy that could help Washington compete successfully with China and Russia short of military intervention or sending, as Washington just did, a nuclear submarine with 175 independently targeted missiles to the Persian Gulf as recently happened. That is the American response: not knowing what to do politically, economically to counter its growing loss of influence and control, they fall back on that old song – send in the troops.

Joel Edelstein: I think there are a lot of voices now, or at least there are some, to challenge the notion that whatever you thought of the effort of empire … stop it! We cannot aspire any longer to “empire” if it ever made sense – and I’m not saying it ever did  – and we’ve got to transition to living in a polycentric world in which the United States is one of a number of important powers. That’s a real challenge; it’s a challenge for the whole country. It’s a challenge because there are a lot of Americans who believe that we are the ones to run the world.

Ibrahim Kazerooni: This has been one of the themes that Rob and I have been talking about this repeatedly on our program.

The only way out of the crisis is that notion of Pax Americana that Americans should dominate and dictate to the rest of the world – that phase is over and we have to prepare ourselves for a world in which there are multiple players in global politics, whether regional or global politics. We need to work together if we really want peace. This notion that Simon refers to “to make the Middle East a better place for its people while advancing U.S. strategic interests – this notion has to be abandoned.

People have to be able to decide for themselves how to make their life better. It’s not for the United States to come and dictate and if countries disagree, then we (Washington) send in the military.

Rob Prince: A personal analogy comes to mind.

I was thinking about aging – how can I help it, I’m 78 with health problems that come with it. Recently a friend referred to me as “one of the elders”. I never thought myself that, but I realize I am. Am I going to age “gracefully”or “gracelessly.”  In terms of what you just said Joel, those are the choices open to the United States. The United States has had – let’s just say – a fine run. It’s not about to collapse but its glory days are past and it’s in decline. Frankly, people have been talking about this since the 1970s. There is nothing new about this discussion. Many people understand exactly what you said, Joel. The United States still has an important role to play in the world. Can we adjust to the new multipolar realities. So far the country reminds me of a petulant teenager ‘ “I’m not going to change! I’m not going to change!” Regardless, the world IS changing, and HAS changed. We can either respond to those changes gracefully or … not

Ibrahim Kazerooni: All the signs are that the United States is ill-prepared – or unprepared – to adjust to the new realities.