Iranian-Saudi Reconciliation: New BFFs? What’s The Deal? Why Are They Suddenly “Making Nice”? Consequences? KGNU – Hemispheres, Middle East Dialogues for April 25, 2023. Hosted by Jim Nelson. Transcript Part Two

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Part One

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Part Two:

So now we are beginning to see a completely different Middle East being shaped … What is happening in the Middle East is really a major shift … Why are the Saudi’s trying to establish new relations with its former regional adversaries? It is primarily because they have extensive – actually huge plans – for their own economic and infra-structural needs. The Saudi leadership (MBS) has plans for a quantum leap forward economically and socially and turning their country into a major center for economic, social development as well as to become a regional center for the entertainment industry

Ibrahim Kazerooni

Andrew Bacevich says that the U.S. needs to recognize that it might have a “Suez moment” (meaning as a result of the 1956 tripartite UK, France, Israel invasion of Egypt) in which it (Washington) comes to the understanding that the conflict over the control of the Suez Canal – which Egypt (with Eisenhower’s help) won, that this marked the beginning of Britain’s decline as a global hegemonic power and its retreat from international politics in any major way. Afghanistan, Iraq, – failures the world round – might have led the U.S. to realize that force really isn’t the way to go but that diplomacy, post WWII, is the way to look at the world.

Jim Nelson

Ibrahim Kazerooni: Now it turns out that, despite their religious differences, that Iran and Saudi Arabia can find common ground and work together based on common interests. The interests in common that they have include infra-structural development, trade expansion, in the case of the Iranians, the need for increased investment. The Saudis have made it clear that these opportunities can only be achieved in an environment of regional stability.

Naturally what we have as a consequence of this rapproachment between Saudi Arabia and Iran – the possibility of resolving what are called the “peripheral disputes” now exists – such as is the case in Yemen, in Syria, in Lebanon, the issue with Hamas and a few others. There was an article by Scott Ritter in Consortium News, “Syria Comes In From The Cold.” The beginning of that article said that “while the world continues with the reality and consequence of the Chinese brokered rapproachment between Saudi Arabia and Iran, another diplomatic coup is unfolding in the Middle East, one orchestrated by Russia which is the Saudi foreign minister’s visit to Syria.” Saudi-Syrian relations were broken in 2012. Now the Saudi foreign minister’s visit to Damascus will be followed by the Syrian foreign minister’s visit to Riyadh.

So now we are beginning to see a completely different Middle East being shaped.

How could have thought that Hamas could send a delegation to Saudi Arabia with the invitation from Saudi Arabia.(1) Who could have even imagined four or five years ago that Hezbollah might send a delegation to Saudi Arabia.(2) The Iraqis are working very hard to attract Saudi investments to help with Baghdad’s infra-structural needs. What is happening in the Middle East is really a major shift.

Why are the Saudi’s trying to establish new relations with its former regional adversaries? It is primarily because they have extensive – actually huge plans – for their own economic and infra-structural needs. The Saudi leadership (MBS) has plans for a quantum leap forward economically and socially and turning their country into a major center for economic, social development as well as to become a regional center for the entertainment industry.

Rob, what do you think Washington’s response would be in the light of this tectonic shift taking place? I know we’ve been talking about “the wounded beast syndrome;” what do you expect?

Jim Nelson: Can I just jump in here?

Andrew Bacevich says that the U.S. needs to recognize that it might have a “Suez moment” (meaning as a result of the 1956 tripartite UK, France, Israel invasion of Egypt) in which it (Washington) comes to the understanding that the conflict over the control of the Suez Canal – which Egypt (with Eisenhower’s help) won, that this marked the beginning of Britain’s decline as a global hegemonic power and its retreat from international politics in any major way. Afghanistan, Iraq, – failures the world round – might have led the U.S. to realize that force really isn’t the way to go but that diplomacy, post WWII, is the way to look at the world.

Ibrahim Kazerooni: This example of the Suez Canal being used as an example of how the Suez Canal became the turning point for the British Empire, and the collapse of the British Empire, … I believe as a matter of fact that one Iranian newspaper it was briefly mentioned that this Chinese brokered rapproachment between the Saudis and Iranians … and the Russian rapproachment between Syria and Saudi Arabia might be, might be, a comparable parallel, might have the same consequences for the American influence in the region as the Suez Canal incident had for the British.

Rob Prince: Let me add something here.

For the listeners, when we talk about the “Suez Canal Moment” we’re referring to the 1956 Tripartite UK, France, Israel invasion of Egypt in response to Nasser’s nationalizing the Suez Canal. That aggression was stopped by a phone call from U.S. President Eisenhower to his British and French counterparts, telling them to end the intervention, which they did. That’s all it took at the time – a phone call – “get out of Egypt” – and they did!

It was at the moment of the Suez crisis that the British leadership clearly understood that the days of the British Empire were over. Its foreign policy shifted accordingly as a result. The question here is – in terms of talking about the implications of the Chinese orchestrated negotiations leading to Iranian-Saudi reconciliation – is does the United States government realize that the world has changed to such a degree and that this moment in history when the U.S. was the world’s hegemonic power – that those days also are over.

It was at the moment of the Suez crisis that the British leadership clearly understood that the days of the British Empire were over. Its foreign policy shifted accordingly as a result. The question here is – in terms of talking about the implications of the Chinese orchestrated negotiations leading to Iranian-Saudi reconciliation – is does the United States government realize that the world has changed to such a degree and that this moment in history when the U.S. was the world’s hegemonic power – that those days also are over.

I don’t think Washington has figured that out.

So, yes, the world has changed.

Think about what it would mean if Washington understood that the days of its control over the global economy, its hegemony, were over, had finished. The United State would have an entirely different – more constructive – approach, not only to what is happening in the Middle East, but its relations to China, Russia, to world problems in general. It’s foreign policy would not be so defensive; it would not be so aggressive in its posture. In fact that is all U.S. foreign policy has been about: it’s about trying to stop others from reaching their potential in the world; Rather then enhancing global economic and social development it’s about freezing these processes in the rest of the world as a way of maintaining U.S. leadership.

So there are limits to the Suez comparison.

Having discussed this, I want to return to the issues that Ibrahim and I were discussing: what the changes in the world, the shift from a unipolar to multipolar world, mean both to Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The case of Iran is easy.

Iran attempted at another moment in time (2010-2015) to engage the United States and “the West” (Europe) through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA – Iran Nuclear Deal). Let us remember who killed the deal: the Trump Administration. Also, in the midst of the negotiations meant to normalize Iranian relations with Washington and Europe one of the compromises of which was ending sanctions in exchange for Iran limiting its nuclear power advances, – in the midst of these negotiations, what is that the United States did: it not only did not lift the sanctions against Iran but imposed many more. And Washington is still pouring more sanctions on Iran. I was reading today that there are more sanctions coming

What was the lesson of all this for Iran?

It was clear and simple: there is no negotiating with the United States and the West. They are not reliable negotiating partners. Iran turns towards China and Russia and that it has done for some time now.

The more surprising development has to do with Saudi Arabia, longtime anchor of U.S. Middle East and international energy policy. Saudi Arabia – I wouldn’t say it was a U.S. creation; it was a British creation but post World War II Saudi Arabia and the United States have been joined at the hip in a crystal clear relationship: Saudi Arabia produces – in amounts Washington dictates – oil for the global economy and the United States will provide security. In the 1970s another cardinal principle of the relationship was crafted: that all economic exchanges involving oil would take place in dollars, thus stabilizing the dollar as the primo international currency in the period after Washington had gone off of the gold standard.

That relationship is breaking down.

There are many factors to Saudi’s shift towards Asia but one development is of note and has not been largely discussed. U.S. oil imports from Saudi Arabia have dropped precipitously over the past two decades. Earlier on the United States was one of the main recipients of Saudi oil. As the United States has tried in different administrations – not just Republican or Democratic; it’s a bipartisan policy – to reduce its dependence on Saudi oil. It accomplished this. Not only that, Washington has gone from an importer to an exporter of oil, and thus is increasingly in competition with the Saudis and other oil producers.

How did the Saudis respond to these changing economic relations with Washington? No mystery. It began to search for other markets for its oil and it’s finding them where? in Asia, particularly in China. So there actually, in part, a material basis for the Saudi political shift that we are seeing that is really discussed publicly here in the USA.

That is one element of the “new Saudi political thinking.”

Ibrahim Kazerooni: Rob, can I just interject here as we don’t have much time to finish our analysis. I think we should go back to the point concerning what options are available in light of this changing world for the United States.

End Part II.

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1. Saudi Arabia and Hamas have a long history of hostility, a part of the larger – Wahhabist-Moslem Brotherhood tensions.

2. Saudi Arabia and Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shi’ite political movement, have also been at odds, in conflict, a consequence of Sunni-Shi’ite splits and their different positions visavis Washington (Saudi in the U.S. camp, Hezbollah opposed).

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Relevant Link: Iran-Saudi Peace and Chinese involvement in Middle East

Saudi’s “Vision 2030” a plan for economic and social development. First introduced to this a decade ago. I was mistakenly cynical about the project.