Iranian-Saudi Reconciliation: New BFFs? What’s The Deal? Why Are They Suddenly “Making Nice”? Consequences? KGNU – Hemispheres, Middle East Dialogues for April 25, 2023. Hosted by Jim Nelson. Transcript Part Three

Wang Yi of the Communist Party of China, Ali Shamkhani, of Iran, Saudi Arabia’s Musaad bin Mohammed Al Aiban pose in Beijing, China, 10 March 2023 (AFP) 2.jpg

__________________________________

(continued from Part Two)

__________________________________

You can see the degree of panic in Washington concerning these developments in the region. The day this rapproachment was announced Netanyahu called leader of the (United Arab) Emirates asking for an urgent meeting asking for a normalization of the Israeli-UAE relationship as it exists under the Abrahamic Accords agreement that was finalized during the Trump Administration days. They (the Israelis) are worried as a consequence (of the Iranian-Saudi rapproachment).

The Saudis are moving towards a more autonomous relationship from the United States. There is nothing that the United States can do about it apart from resenting these developments. The decision of OPEC Plus (OPEC+) to reduce world oil production (in response to a slowing of the world economy) to maintain price stability is going to affect the United States.

Ibrahim Kazerooni

Israel is in a tizzy over this and really doesn’t know how to handle these developments. Tel Aviv is particularly concerned that one of the consequences of this (Iranian-Saudi) deal has been diplomatic moves to resolve regional conflicts in both Yemen and Syria. At least we’re seeing the beginning of diplomatic moves in this direction, a direct result of the Chinese brokered Iranian-Saudi rapproachment. The last thing that Israel would like to see is a resolution of the Syrian crisis and the rebuilding of that war-torn nation. Rob Prince

Ibrahim Kazerooni: Rob, can I just interject here as we don’t have much time to finish our analysis. I think we should go back to the point concerning what options are available in light of this changing world for the United States

In the light of the current crisis you indicated that you don’t think that Washington understands what is going on. The Cradle has an article that says that the “U.S. Flexes Its Muscle in the Persian Gulf to No Avail.”

What are the options for the United States in the light of the current crisis?

Rob Prince: In light of the current crisis, what’s necessary for Washington to regain lost influence in the Middle East involves, from where I am sitting, something of a sea change in policy, one that appears the furthest thing from Washington’s current policies. If the United States is going to reduce its dependence on Saudi oil, what is it offering Saudi Arabia in exchange? At this point, it’s really not very much.

Of course there are ways for the United States to compete with China in the region not just for China and Saudi Arabia, but also for the United States. It could help rather than hinder regional economic development; it could help the infrastructural development which has hardly taken place over all these years of U.S.-Saudi “friendship.” The main change needed is that Washington needs a different overall approach to the politics in the region.

The essence of the U.S. approach is “divide and conquer” – as you mentioned earlier, Ibrahim, Ibrahim, partition. Look at the way the region has been partitioned going back to the Sykes Picot Agreement – the original modern partition – and including the fate of Libya, Iraq, what Washington tried to do – and is still trying to do – in Syria, either de facto or de jure partition. This has to be the end of that approach. Partition, regime change – ultimately even if they succeed in the short term, they are not in the benefit of the United States in the long run as they sow discontent and chaos throughout the region. These policies certainly do not benefit the region.

What is needed is a non-hegemonic vision. It’s hard to imagine that the current administration has any interest in moving in that direction. The world has changed; the United States definitely could play a positive role in these changes, but it has to change too. There are no signs in Washington that these changes are taking place.

Ibrahim, what do you think of that?

Ibrahim Kazerooni: Rob I tend to agree with you as well as sharing the views of the above mentioned article in “The Cradle” stating the same thing, that Washington’s options (in the Middle East) in light of the events transpiring there are really limited. There is nothing that the United States can do unless it changes course. We need to deconstruct the U.S.’s response to what is unfolding in the region into various components.

First of all, the Saudi-Iranian detente, so to speak, and the joint statement that has been made public both in China and individually from both in Riyadh and Teheran, the invitation from the Saudi king to the Iranian president and the invitation from the Iranian president to King Salman to visit Iran … on the one hand it shows that Saudi Arabia intends to consolidate this detente, this relationship, because it is beneficial; it can do much to help its modernization plans.

You can see the degree of panic in Washington concerning these developments in the region. The day this rapproachment was announced Netanyahu called leader of the (United Arab) Emirates asking for an urgent meeting asking for a normalization of the Israeli-UAE relationship as it exists under the Abrahamic Accords agreement that was finalized during the Trump Administration days. They (the Israelis) are worried as a consequence (of the Iranian-Saudi rapproachment).

The Saudis are moving towards a more autonomous relationship from the United States. There is nothing that the United States can do about it apart from resenting these developments. The decision of OPEC Plus (OPEC+) to reduce world oil production (in response to a slowing of the world economy) to maintain price stability is going to affect the United States.

What might the United States do to minimize or roll back these changes?

It cannot undermine Saudi Arabia’s government – such a move would destabilize the international relations – so it continues to target Iran, by increasing sanctions against it, and putting more pressure on the government in a number of other ways. This could lead to some kind of U.S.-Iran showdown.

The shifting geopolitical situation in West Asia challenging to Washington. The United States has stretched itself so far that without retrenching some and starting all over again, it will not be able to develop a strategy that can counter the proactive approaches of China and Russia working together in the region. I don’t believe that a policy of targeted assassination – as happened to King Faisal in 1975 – is an option for the United States to pursue because it is not possible these days for that kind of strategy to work.

Furthermore, the Saudis have made it clear that they have an economic social vision and plan that they intend to implement irrespective of whether the United States is resentful or not. For their part, by now the Iranians have gotten used to sanction after sanction. They are becoming extremely active throughout the region. Even the Israelis are concerned. There was an article that appeared in the Israeli press that argued that while “we” (the Israelis) are at each other’s throats that Iran is making inroads throughout the reason. The article goes on to speculate that Israel might have to settle with the idea, agree to the fact that Iran is going to play a major role in the region. Now with the help of the Chinese, the Russians and investments possibly from Saudi Arabia – the Saudis have indicated that they will move in this direction – Iran’s regional importance will continue to grow.

So in response to your question Rob, it appears that there is hardly anything left for the United States in the region. In the absence of reflection, thinking about coming up with a new strategy, wanting to continue with the same old strategy, Washington’s options for regaining its influence, its respect from regional players – are limited indeed.

(What followed were several phone calls to the station. The first of these was little more than what I would refer to as a rant, one that had nothing to do with the program itself and does not merit our attention. A second caller asked how Iranian-Saudi reconciliation effects Israel.)

Caller: My name is Carolyn ? (couldn’t make out the last name). My question has to do with Israel and how this (Iranian-Saudi rappoachment) is going to effect Israel and U.S. support of Israel? I haven’t heard much about that.

Rob Prince: Ok, sure. One of the losers in all this, the Iranian-Saudi reconciliation) besides the United States, is Israel. In fact, Israel is in something of a panic over these developments. You don’t get a sense of this so much here in the United States but if you read the Israeli press, and certainly the press of other Middle Eastern countries, it’s clear that Israeli finds itself in a dilemma. This changing global balance of forces is something that, like Washington, Israel has not figured out how to deal with at all.

How does Iranian-Saudi reconciliation impact on Israel’s regional aspirations? It knocks the so-called “Abrahamic Accords” out of the box, precisely. The Accords are Israel’s effort to normalize relations with certain Arab countries. In its essence all the Abrahamic Accords represent is little more than a U.S.-Israeli attempt to forge an anti-Iranian front by another name.

Israel is in a tizzy over this and really doesn’t know how to handle these developments. Tel Aviv is particularly concerned that one of the consequences of this (Iranian-Saudi) deal has been diplomatic moves to resolve regional conflicts in both Yemen and Syria. At least we’re seeing the beginning of diplomatic moves in this direction, a direct result of the Chinese brokered Iranian-Saudi rapproachment. The last thing that Israel would like to see is a resolution of the Syrian crisis and the rebuilding of that war-torn nation. Israel is in a tizzy over this and really doesn’t know how to handle these developments. Tel Aviv is particularly concerned that one of the consequences of this deal has been diplomatic moves to resolve regional conflicts in both Yemen and Syria. At least we’re seeing the beginning of diplomatic moves in this direction, a direct result of the Chinese brokered Iranian-Saudi rapproachment. The last thing that Israel would like to see is a resolution of the Syrian crisis and the rebuilding of that war-torn nation.

Ibrahim Kazerooni: Yes, it is.

Ibrahim Kazerooni: Yes, it is.

The rapproachment between Saudi Arabia and Iran is leading to a united front, what is referred to as the Axis of Resistance. This is something that the Israeli press has been talking about during the past week. A united front means opening up the fronts opposing Israel both to the north and to the south, and this to the degree that Israel has not had to confront until now. To date, the Israelis have been unable to deal with this development.

Like the United States, Israel find themselves in a pickle. They need to shift their policy, their strategy for the region. I don’t believe that the upper echelons of Israeli society, both the military and the political echelons, that there is a will or desire for such a policy shift to take place.

Rob Prince: For those who follow Israeli politics closely, they themselves admit that they are in trouble.

I would add something here, this is my personal take: I was surprised that given his record, the charges of corruption which continue to haunt his administration, the current polarization in Israeli society, that the Israelis chose Netanyahu again as their leader and brought him back to the helm. My hunch as to what was behind this development is that he has more experience with interacting with the regional players. He also has had decent relations with Russia. I’m convinced that is one of the key reasons why he is, once again, Israel’s prime minister. But the region is moving so quickly in new directions – that is the problem and not even the politically nimble (if totally reactionary) Binjamin Netanyahu is incapable (at least until now) of knowing what to do about it.

Ibrahim Kazerooni: The Israelis are saying that because the United States is over-stretched internationally, that it will not be there to fight for Israel and that Israel has to prepare itself for this long-term. We saw the effect of a multi-front military response to Israeli attacks on the El Aqsa Mosque (in Jerusalem). Missiles were launched from both the north (S. Lebanon) and Gaza simultaneously forcing Israel’s hand to end the attack on the mosque only a few days after Israeli religious fanatics began their attacks. Threats that both Syria and Yemen might join in this military response in addition forced Israel’s hand to end the barbaric attack on Islam’s third holy place.

All this suggests the degree to which a united front against Israel is coming together. Representatives of Hamas and other elements of the Palestinian Resistance Movement are traveling throughout the region looking for – and getting support. This is the dynamic that we were talking about – the New Middle East, a tectonic shift, that neither the Israelis or the United States are prepared to accept. It is not clear that they even understand the new realities.

End of transcript.

Part One

Part Two

__________________________________

hmmm . Seems Washington is losing its touch in the Middle East